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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - Fourth Amendment Protection
Does Not Extend to Open Fields - Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170 (1984)
FACTS
In Oliver v. United States,' two narcotics agents of the Ken-
tucky State Police went to Oliver's farm to investigate reports of
marijuana cultivation. Without a warrant, they passed Oliver's
home and several "No Trespressing" signs, and went around a
locked gate. Over one mile from Oliver's home, the agents dis-
covered a secluded field of marijuana. Oliver was arrested, but
the district court suppressed the evidence of the discovered mariju-
ana field. The court of appeals reversed.2
In Maine v. Thornton,3 acting on an anonymous tip, two police
officers entered the woods behind Thornton's residence by way
of a path from a neighboring house. There they found two con-
cealed patches of marijuana, fenced with chicken wire and posted
with "No Trespassing" signs. After ensuring that the marijuana
was on Thornton's property, the officers obtained a search war-
rant, seized the marijuana, and arrested Thornton. The trial court
suppressed the evidence of the marijuana. The Maine Supreme
Judicial Court affirmed.'
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in both
cases, affirming Oliver v. United States and reversing and remand-
ing Maine v. Thornton in a consolidation of the two actions.' The
Court considered the validity of the fifty-year-old "open fields"
doctrine" in light of modern fourth amendment" standards8 and
held that the doctrine applied in both actions. By examining the
language and history of the fourth amendment, the Court con-
cluded that its protection against an unreasonable search and sei-
zure does not extend to open fields. The Court further held this
conclusion to be consistent with its "understanding of the right
1. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
2. United States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356, 358 (6th Cir. 1982) (en banc), affd, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
3. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
4. State v. Thornton, 453 A.2d 489, 490-91 (Me. 1982), rev'd and remanded, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
5. 466 U.S. at 184.
6. "[Tjhe 'open fields' doctrine, first enunciated by this Court in Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57
(1924), permits police officers to enter and search a field without warrant." Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173.
7. "The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath of affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CoNST. amend. IV.
8. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) and subsequent cases relying on the standards Katz
set forth. See infra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
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to privacy expressed in ...Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,"9
since one cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an
open field.' °
This note examines the history and background of the "open
fields" doctrine in the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence
and discusses the unique status of the doctrine in Mississippi. Fur-
ther, the rationale and implications of Oliver v. United States"
are analyzed, with special attention to its effect on the law in Mis-
sissippi.
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
Until the fourth amendment and the exclusionary rule were ap-
plied to the states, judicial interpretation of the amendment was
rare. The only major case prior to this century was Boyd v. United
States," which first examined the historical need for the fourth
amendment. The amendment was "a reaction to the evils of the
use of the general warrant in England and the writs of assistance
in the Colonies, and was intended to protect against invasions of
'the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life,'13 . . . from
searches under indiscriminate, general authority."' However, the
narrow holding was that the federal statute and the resulting fed-
eral action compelling production of one's private papers was
invalid" since actual entry onto private premises was not always
necessary to constitute an unreasonable search and seizure. 6
The determination of fourth amendment violations quickly as-
sumed a greater importance with the adoption of the exclusion-
ary rule. 7 Protection against an unreasonable search and seizure
was extended to those accused of a crime. Illegally obtained evi-
dence could not be used in the trial of one who had been so ag-
grieved.18
In 1949, the Supreme Court again applied fourth amendment
principles to the states," but the only remedies of the accused lay
in an action for damages for trespass or a prosecution for oppres-
sion.2" Thus, the holding was of little consequence until 1961,
9, 466 U.S. at 177.
10. Id. at 183-84.
I1. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
12. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
13. Id. at 630 (breaking into one's house and opening boxes and drawers).
14. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden. 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967).
15. Failure to produce the given papers was considered a confession. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 620.
16. Id. at 617-20, 630, 638.
17. Weeks v. United States. 232 U.S. 383. 392 (1914).
18. Id. at 398.
19. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25. 33 (1949).
20. Id. at 31 n.2.
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when the exclusionary rule was applied to the states.21 Because
all other remedies had failed,2" the Court believed that the exclu-
sionary rule was necessary to enjoyment of fourth amendment
rights. "3
Well before the fourth amendment was applied to the states,
the Supreme Court, in Hester v. United States,2" had read the
amendment as excluding open fields from its protection. This hold-
ing came to be known as the "open fields" doctrine. In Hester,
revenue officers hid near the home of Hester's father and witnessed
an exchange of illicit moonshine whiskey. They entered the land
and examined a jug which had been broken. This evidence, ob-
tained in the open field and disclosed by Hester himself, became
the basis of his conviction. Although the search was without war-
rant,25 the Court held that "the special protection accorded by the
Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers,
and effects,' is not extended to the open fields. The distinction
between the latter and the house is as old as the common law." 6
This distinction between open fields and one's house was not re-
fined until Olmstead v. United States. 7 The Court in Olmstead
indicated that either persons, papers, or effects must be searched
or seized, or there must be an actual, physical invasion of the
curtilage before the fourth amendment is violated. " Thus it ap-
pears the distinction set forth in Hester was the common law con-
cept of curtilage, a concept most often important in prosecutions
for burglary before Olmstead.
No complete definition of "curtilage" exists; it has been of
primary importance in deciding whether a given outbuilding may
be the subject of a burglary. 9 However, some definitions in the
context of search and seizure law have been attempted: Tradi-
tionally, "[t]he curtilage includes those outbuildings which are
directly and intimately connected with the habitation and in prox-
imity thereto . . . and the land or grounds surrounding the dwell-
ing which are necessary and convenient and habitually used for
family purposes and carrying on domestic employment." 0 More
21. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
22. Id. at 651-52.
23. Id. at 655-56.
24. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
25. Id. at 58.
26. Id. at 59.
27. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). A large conspiracy to import, possess, and sell liquor illegally was discovered
by intercepting phone calls of the conspirators from outside their property. The fourth amendment was not
violated. Id. at 455-56.
28. Id. at 465-66.
29. Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 833 (1955).
30. State v. Hanson, 113 N.H. 689, 691, 313 A.2d 730, 732 (1973).
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important was the Olmstead requirement that the invasion of the
curtilage be an actual, physical invasion; in short, a trespass.3'
This "trespass doctrine" resulted in fine, artificial distinctions
but was definitive of fourth amendment standards3" until the land-
mark decision of Katz v. United States" in 1967. Having previ-
ously recognized that the protection of privacy is the principal
object of the fourth amendment, 4 the Court established a new stan-
dard to determine whether this objective had been met. In Katz,
F.B.I. agents had attached an electronic device to the outside of
the telephone booth, avoiding a technical trespass. The evidence
obtained thereby was permitted in the trial for showing transmis-
sion of wagering information by telephone in violation of a fed-
eral statute.3 The Court said that the traditional idea of
"constitutionally protected area" does not help solve the problem
in this particular case, 6 because the fourth amendment goes further
and protects people, not simply areas. Once this concept is rec-
ognized, it "becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot
turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any
given enclosure." 7 Therefore, the trespass doctrine is no longer
controlling. 8 Instead, for a person to be protected by the fourth
amendment, he must claim "a justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' or a
'legitimate expectation of privacy"' that has been invaded by the
government. 9
The Court has adopted a two-pronged test for examining such
a privacy expectation: normally, there must be both an actual,
subjective expectation of privacy and an objective one, that is,
one that society recognizes as reasonable or justifiable under the
circumstances. 0 The reasonableness of the search is determined
by "balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests against its promotion of legitimate government interests."41
31. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
32. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (evidence obtained by use of a detectaphone placed
against the wall of an office). Both Olmstead and Goldman were at least partially overruled. Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). Revision of this "trespass" doctrine had been signalled in Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), where the Court found an unreasonable search only by distinguishing the particu-
lar electronic equipment used and its required method of installation from that used in Olmstead and Goldman.
Id. at 509-13 (Douglas, J., concurring).
33. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
34. Warden, 387 U.S. at 304.
35. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
36. Id. at 351.
37. Id. at 353. The dissent claimed that the Court went beyond the language of the amendment by including
eavesdropping, stating that eavesdropping, though not electronic, existed at the time the amendment was framed,
and the authors of the amendment would have included eavesdropping in the language had they intended such
protection. Id. at 366 (Black, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 353.
39. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
40. Id. (all circumstances must be considered); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977).
41. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
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No one factor, such as a property interest in or a legitimate
presence on the premises, is controlling. 2 For example, the
presence of normal precautions to maintain privacy and the use
made of a particular location are also relevant factors."
Throughout these changes in fourth amendment doctrine, the
distinction between the home and the open area has continued.
A search within a home without a warrant has remained per se
unreasonable." However, the application of the Katz standard to
Hester open fields cases has been rare in the Supreme Court and
confusing in lower courts, making apparent the need for a defini-
tive statement. The clearest statement is found in a concurring
opinion in Katz. Relying on Hester, the second Justice Harlan
stated that an open field is not an area like a home or a telephone
booth where "a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable
expectation of privacy.""
Despite this language in Katz, the only Supreme Court case to
rely on the Hester open fields doctrine was equivocal. The
defendant-corporation was held not to be protected from the search
for evidence by a government inspector on the open fields of its
premises. But great emphasis was placed on the fact that the in-
spector was not in an area from which the public was excluded.
The Court did not indicate whether the result would have been
different had the public been excluded. " Nevertheless, in 1983,
with a decision on the open fields doctrine in sight, the Court hinted
that it would uphold the doctrine when there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy in objects in open fields. 7
The need for an unequivocal decision by the Supreme Court
is apparent from the multifarious decisions of the circuits and the
states." An especially interesting example is the Fifth Circuit.
Although its decisions have been consistent with the open fields
doctrine, its theory has changed from one of strictly applying
42. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978).
43. Id. at 152-53 (Powell, J., concurring).
44. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586-87 (1980).
45. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
46. Air Pollution Var. Rd. of Colo. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 863-65 (1974). A later case
indicated that the officer must be where the public is not excluded, but the "open field" was not involved. Mar-
shall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 315 (1978). But lower courts did apply the distinction to open fields.
See, e.g., United States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 854 (1984). The
Supreme Court also applied Hester in two seizure cases in concluding that there had been no invasion of privacy.
G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352 (1977); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38,
42 (1976) (Hester analogized).
47. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983).
48. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE - A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.4(a) (1978
& Supp. 1984). Various circuit and state court decisions are cited. Fifth Circuit decisions are cited in this note
to illustrate the change in theory within this circuit; the decisions of various southern states are cited to illus-
trate their representative diversity as well as the number of recent open fields decisions.
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Hester ' to something of a reconciliation of Hester's open fields
doctrine with the Katz privacy standard. Thus the open fields de-
termination is merely "helpful" in the requisite fourth amendment
analysis and not conclusive in the Fifth Circuit. 0 The possibility
that barriers, even natural barriers, could manifest a legitimate
expectation of privacy in an open field has been expressly left
open."1
The southern states confronted with the issue are typical in their
uneven application of Katz and Hester. Some have relied on the
Hester doctrine without qualification. 2 Others have found the doc-
trine useful in determining whether reasonable privacy expecta-
tions exist.5 3 Still others have held Hester to be of little
consequence."
THE OPEN FIELDS DOCTRINE IN MISSISSIPPI
The state of Mississippi has not adhered to the open fields doc-
trine. This result is possible because the Supreme Court has en-
sured only that fourth amendment standards are applied to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. 5 The relevant question
for the Supreme Court is "not whether the search . . . was autho-
rized by state law. The question is rather whether the search was
reasonable under the fourth amendment."" Therefore, the Court
has stated that its "holding, of course, does not affect the State's
power to impose higher standards on searches and seizures than
required by the Federal Constitution if it chooses to do so.""' If
only state standards have been violated, the state alone may
review."
Mississippi appears to be the only state which still construes
its constitutional "search and seizure" provision to apply even to
unenclosed fields, based on the use of the word "possessions.""
49. Atwell v. United States, 414 F.2d 136, 138 (5th Cir. 1969) (a still found outside the curtilage); United
States v. Brown, 473 F.2d 952, 954 (5th Cir. 1973) (stolen money found buried on abandoned property).
50. United States v. Williams, 581 F.2d 451, 453 (5th Cir." 1978) (curtilage not broken by crossing a dilapi-
dated fence).
51. United States v. Baldwin, 691 F.2d 718, 723 (5th Cir. 1982).
52. Ford v. State, 264 Ark. 141, 142-43, 569 S.W.2d 105, 106 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 947 (1979);
Skipper v. State, 387 So. 2d 261 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980), writ denied, 387 So. 2d 268 (Ala. 1980); Williams
v. State, 157 Ga. App. 476, 277 S.E.2d 923 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823 (1981).
53. State v. Brady, 406 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 1981) (respecting landowner's privacy expectation in relation
to a particular open field as demonstrated by defendant's use of numerous protective measures), cert. granted,
459 U.S. 986 (1982), vacated, 104 S. Ct. 2380 (1984); Goehring v. State, 627 S.W.2d 159, 162-63 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1982).
54. State v. Wert, 550 S.W.2d I, 2 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977); State v. Byers, 359 So. 2d 84 (La. 1978).
55. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
56. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 61 (1968) (quoting Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61 (1967)).
57. Cooper, 386 U.S. at 62.
58. Id.
59. 79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures, §10 n.78 (1952 & Supp. 1984).
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This broad construction was adopted by the court in Faulkner v.
State,"0 decided about three months before Hester. The Faulkner
court found that the Mississippi provision protects the people in
their "persons, houses, and possessions," 1 while the federal pro-
vision applies to "persons, houses, papers, and effects."" Thus
Faulkner holds that, unlike the words "papers" and "effects," the
term "possessions" embraces "all of the property of the citizen.""
The Alabama Constitution also has a provision similar to Mis-
sissippi's, but its courts have held that since use of the word "pos-
sessions" in the state constitution" is not an attempt to enlarge
the meaning of the word "effects" in the Federal Constitution,"
open fields are protected by neither the federal nor the state con-
stitution. Although the Alabama court noted the exceptions of
Mississippi and Tennessee, 7 Tennessee courts no longer construe
the Tennessee Constitution more favorably to the accused than
the Federal Constitution, since the "Supreme Court has rejected
the premise that distinctions based upon property interests con-
trol the right of the state or government to search and seize under
the fourth amendment. 6 8
The term "open fields" has not been used by the Mississippi
courts because the question of trespass has been dispositive in
every type of case. In other words, the trespass doctrine has been
applied to all the property of the accused and not just to deter-
mine that a search within the curtilage was unreasonable. 9 In 1930,
the Mississippi Supreme Court held that an officer may observe"
or listen"' as long as he does not trespass or violate one's right
of privacy. 2 Forty years later, the court adhered to its previous
60. 134 Miss. 253, 98 So. 691 (1924). The court held that a sheriff and his deputy violated the state consti-
tution when they observed a still in operation in wooded land belonging to one of the defendants. Id. at 256-57,
98 So. 691-92.
61. Miss. CONST. art. Il, § 23.
62. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
63. 134 Miss. at 261, 98 So. at 693.
64. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 5.
65. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
66. Skipper v. State, 387 So. 2d 261,263 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980), writ denied, 387 So. 2d 268 (Ala. 1980).
67. Id. at 263.
68. State v. Wert, 550 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977); Sneed v. State, 221 Tenn. 6, 423 S.W.2d
857 (1967).
69. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
70. Goodman v. State, 158 Miss. 269, 130 So. 285 (1930).
71. Goode v. State, 158 Miss. 616, 620, 131 So. 106, 108 (1930).
72. Goodman, 158 Miss. at 273, 130 So. at 286. Various non-dispositive factors are "the place searched,
the thing seized, the purpose for, and the circumstances under which the search or seizure was made, and
the presence or absence of probable cause therefor." Moore v. State, 138 Miss. 116, 155, 103 So. 483, 485
(1925).
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decisions and held that a trespass on abandoned land made the
search there illegal.7
INSTANT CASE
The case of Oliver v. United States74 upheld the open fields doc-
trine of Hester as an exception to the protection of the fourth
amendment. The Court relied on the explicit language of the
amendment, reasoning that fourth amendment doctrine had not
been severed from its language by the "expectations" test. The
Katz standard merely identified the extent to which people and
their property, not simply areas, as listed in the amendment, are
protected.7" However, the Court went on to hold that applying
the expectations test of Katz would yield a result consistent with
fourth amendment language as the Court interprets it. 6
The Court found several factors which indicate that one simply
cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an open field
and thereby preclude a warrantless search of that field. Normally,
those intimate activities intended to be protected by the amend-
ment do not occur in open fields,77 nor conversely, does society
protect the usual uses of open fields.78 Further, open fields are
accessible to the public and the police. In this connection, it was
conceded that "the public and police lawfully may survey lands
from the air."'79 The Court added these factors together, deter-
mining that there is not a legitimate expectation of privacy even
under Katz. Furthermore, courts which have applied the expec-
tations test to open fields continued to uphold the common law
distinction between open fields and curtilage, which is itself de-
fined "by reference to the factors that determine whether an in-
dividual reasonably may expect that an area immediately adjacent
73. Davidson v. State, 240 So. 2d 463, 464. (Miss. 1970). When an officer observed marijuana plants from
neighboring premises, Davidson did not apply because there was no trespass, Sims v. State, 257 So. 2d 210,
211-12 (Miss. 1972), but if the officer were to cross over for a moment any search on the premises would
be illegal, evidence obtained would be excluded, and a search warrant based on that search would be invalid.
Isaacks v. State, 350 So. 2d 1340, 1344 (Miss. 1977).
74. 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (Powell, J., delivered the opinion).
75. Id. at 176 n.6. The Court also said that the term "effects" is less inclusive than the term "property,"
which was stricken from Madison's proposed draft of the fourth amendment. Thus the term "effects" did not
include open fields. Id. at 177.
76. Id. The dissent suggests that the Court proceeded to an "expectations" analysis because it was "[s]ensi-
tive to the weakness of its argument that the 'persons and things' mentioned in the Fourth Amendment exhaust
the coverage of the provision." Id. at 188 n.7 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 179. Even in those rare cases where such activities do occur, the individual is still protected by
the amendment against unreasonable arrest or seizure of effects on the person, for example. Id. at 179 n. 10.
78. Id. at 179 (such as cultivation of crops).
79. Id. at 179. Thus, as a practical matter, even if a privacy expectation were legitimate as to trespassers,
police would just be required to obtain needed information by aerial surveillance. Id. at 179 n.9.
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to the home will remain private."8 Here, the Court disapproved
the use of a case-by-case approach in open fields situations as not
meeting the needs of law enforcement personnel to discern the
scope of their authority or the need of citizens and courts to have
the equitable enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court added
that problems do arise in the necessary determination of whether
an area is in the open field or the curtilage but that this is only
occasionally difficult.8
The Court also noted that steps taken to protect privacy and
the effect of trespass during the search are not relevant in the in-
stant case. First, an individual cannot create a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy merely by choosing to conceal certain activities.
If the government's intrusion does not infringe on those values
protected by the fourth amendment to begin with, then an indi-
vidual's expectation of privacy, resulting from definite steps to
protect that privacy, is not legitimate." With regard to the effect
of trespass, trespass laws have only incidentally protected priva-
cy interests, their primary purpose being the protection of property
interests. As a result, in open fields cases, violation of a property
interest has "little or no relevance in determining whether a privacy
interest was violated."8
One Justice concurred only with the point that open fields are
simply not within the explicit language of the fourth amendment.8"
He considered it unnecessary to determine whether a reasonable
expectation of privacy existed in the open fields.8 The dissent
could not agree either that the fourth amendment does not pro-
tect open fields or that one has no legitimate expectation of privacy
in his open field. The dissent considered the omission of open
fields from the language of the fourth amendment unpersuasive
since telephone booths, conversations, commercial buildings, and
the curtilage are protected by the amendment, yet they are like-
wise not included in the amendment's specific language. There-
fore, the Court's constitutional interpretation was rejected as too
narrow to protect people sufficiently.86 The dissent determined
that both the petitioner Oliver and respondent Thornton had legiti-
80. Id. at 180. See, e.g., supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. In the case at hand, there was no con-
tention that property within the curtilage was searched. Id. at 180 n. 11.
81. Id. at 182 n.12.
82. Id. at 182-83.
83. Id. at 183. (" '[Tlhe premise that property interests control the right of the government to search and
seize has been discredited.' Katz, 389 U.S. at 353) (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)).").
84. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
85. Id. at 184 (White, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 186-87 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J., and Stevens, J.).
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mate expectations of privacy, which should be protected by the
fourth amendment:
An owner's right to insist that others stay off his posted land is firmly grounded in positive
law. Many of the uses to which such land may be put deserve privacy. And, by making
the boundaries of the land with warnings that the public should not intrude, the owner
has dispelled any ambiguity as to his desires."
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
The holding in Oliver must have surprised lower courts and
commentators," though it appears consistent with the Supreme
Court's proclivity toward easing restrictions on law enforcement
officials.89 Perhaps the foreseeability of this surprise explains the
Court's conscientious answer to its prospective critics when it ap-
plied the expectations test to open fields. However, the Court is
less conscientious in its short rationale for excepting open fields,
per se, from coverage of the fourth amendment.90 Nevertheless,
the dissent's response that a liberal construction which includes
open fields within the amendment's protection is necessary be-
cause the amendment's coverage has already been extended be-
yond its plain language is unconvincing, despite the dissent's point
that the framers could not have been comprehensive and exact
in a constitution.9" While a liberal construction may be one way
to give a constitutional provision its full, intended effect, the lan-
guage of the fourth amendment has not and should not be ignored.
The holding in Katz did not establish a standard independent
of the language. Rather, Katz held that private telephone conver-
sation must be protected from electronic eavesdropping because
eavesdropping is encompassed by the fourth amendment's pro-
tection of persons, not because a telephone booth was listed in
the amendment. 2 To reach the result urged on the Court by the
dissent, open fields must be among the places or things textually
protected by the amendment or they must be included within a
person's legitimate expectation of privacy. In other words, while
the place of the search does determine whether a person's property
is protected, it does not determine whether a person is protected
due to his privacy expectations.
By definition, open fields are not within the curtilage of a home
87. Id. at 195 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88. See, e.g., supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text. See also Note, How Open Are Open Fields? United
States v. Oliver, 14 U. TOL. L. Rav. 133 (1982).
89. See, e.g., in regard to the exclusionary rule: Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984); Segura v. United
States, 104 S. Ct. 3380 (1984); United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza,
104 S. Ct. 3479 (1984).
90. 466 U.S. at 176-77. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
91. Id. at 186-87. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
92. Id. at 176 n.6.
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and so cannot fall within the protection of persons in their
"houses";" likewise, open fields are not included in the "effects"
contemplated by the fourth amendment.9" Having decided that an
open field is not an area protected within the amendment's mean-
ing, the Court proceeded with an expectations of privacy analy-
sis, probably to avoid a later claim of a legitimate privacy
expectation in an open field, based on the amendment's protec-
tion of the person. By holding that open fields are per se
unprotected by the fourth amendment's privacy protection, the
Court assured conformity with the Hester doctrine and simultane-
ously recognized the continuing vitality of the Katz expectations
test. Unless these are the Court's reasons, its consideration of
privacy expectations is unnecessary."
Two of the reasons advanced in favor of the Court's analysis
are especially important for future consideration of the decision's
consequences. First, participants in activities must remain in pro-
tected areas in order to have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
If they move into an open field and use it, for example, as a meet-
ing place for lovers or for worship services, their privacy expec-
tations are no longer legitimate ones, regardless of their personal
desire to be left alone.9" At that point, the fourth amendment no
longer protects their activities from the officer who stumbles across
them, and so the government may search that area although some
protection from unreasonable search and seizure remains even
then. 7 Thus steps taken to protect privacy, short of building a
house or setting up a tent, thereby creating a curtilage, would not
make the privacy expectation legitimate. 8 Such precautions, as
in the instant case, only deter trespassers and protect property
interests and are not of fourth amendment significance. If these
precautions were to constitute a legitimate privacy expectation,
it would be virtually impossible for law enforcement officials to
judge whether a privacy or a property interest was manifested."0
The second important reason the Court gave for its result is
the abandonment of trespass distinctions, which would have made
searches more difficult by requiring aerial surveillance if there
were no clear view from the ground." 1 Indeed, to prohibit open
93. Id. at 183 n.14. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 73.
95. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
96. Id. at 179 n.10. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 75.
98. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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field searches only in cases like Oliver, where a trespass has oc-
curred, is to return to a form of the trespass doctrine, which has
been rejected by the Supreme Court," 2 and to create a distinction
between two types of searches with no apparent justification other
than where the observation is made. The effect would be to en-
force a drastic remedy for trespass over and above actual damages
to property interests, regardless of whether the trespass was great
or small. Evidence found during a harmless trespass would be
excluded from any resulting criminal trial.
States other than Mississippi conform their search and seizure
holdings to the Federal Constitution and will presumably conform
to Oliver.' On the whole, such state decisions will change little
as a result since, regardless of the particular analysis chosen, state
courts have usually yielded results consistent with the open fields
doctrine." However, the rejection of the trespass doctrine in fourth
amendment jurisprudence has far-reaching implications for Mis-
sissippi. Mississippi cases indicate that a trespass on an open field
makes a search there unreasonable. These holdings vary little from
the trespass doctrine abandoned in Katz. Pre-Katz cases applied
the doctrine only to determine that searches of the curtilage were
unreasonable °5 while Mississippi cases have applied it broadly
to searches of all property, including the open field.1"'
Now is the time for Mississippi to abandon the notion that
property interests equate with privacy interests in open fields. Its
constitutional search and seizure provision should not be given
a broader interpretation than the fourth amendment. The Missis-
sippi interpretation of the word "possessions" to include all real
property makes fourth amendment privacy interests dependent on
and coextensive with property interests. This is the same depen-
dency rejected in Katz, under the name of the trespass doctrine. 0 7
Furthermore, this rejection has been the means by which other
state courts have conformed the interpretation of the word "pos-
sessions" in state constitutions to the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the fourth amendment."0 8
In summary, the Supreme Court has continued to uphold the
Katz expectations test and the liberal construction of the fourth
102. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. In reality, the dissent requires only that the land be posted
and that a trespass occur to find a search unreasonable. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 47 and 51-53 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
108. State v. Wert, 550 S.W.2d 1, 2 (1977). See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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amendment which gave rise to the test, while recognizing that
it is still the plain language of the fourth amendment which the
Court must construe. Thus, the Court has continued to construe
the amendment to protect privacy but has rejected a construction
of the amendment that requires the equation of privacy interests
with property interests. Mississippi has retained the trespass dis-
tinction in its search and seizure law, but is now presented with
a challenge to adopt the reasoned analysis of Oliver and thereby
refrain from unduly restricting law enforcement officials in
searches of open fields. Continued adherence to the position that
open field searches constitute a trespass ignores the importance
of such searches by law enforcement officials when balanced
against the harmless nature of the intrusion.
Oliver M. "Sonny" Anderson, III

